

REMARKS

By this Amendment, Applicants propose to amend claims 1, 9, 13, and 15-17. Support for the amendments may be found in the specification at, for example, page 10, lines 5-19. Claims 1, 9-11, and 13-17 remain pending in this application.

In the Final Office Action¹, the Examiner took the following actions:

- (1) rejected claims 1, 9, 11, 13, and 15-17 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over U.S. Patent App. Pub. No. 2002/0091754 ("Jang") in view of U.S. Patent App. Pub. No. 2002/0052912 ("Griswold"); and
- (2) rejected claims 10 and 14 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Jang in view of Griswold and in further view of U.S. Patent No. 6,865,608 ("Hunter").

Applicants respectfully traverse the above rejections for the following reasons.

I. Rejection of Claims 1, 9, 11, 13, and 15-17 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)

Applicants respectfully traverse the rejection of claims 1, 9, 11, 13, and 15-17 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). No *prima facie* case of obviousness has been established.

The key to supporting any rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 103 is the clear articulation of the reason(s) why the claimed invention would have been obvious. Such an analysis should be made explicit and cannot be premised upon mere conclusory statements. MPEP § 2142, 8th Ed., Rev. 7 (July 2008). "A conclusion of obviousness requires that the references(s) relied upon be enabling in that it put the public in possession of the claimed invention." MPEP § 2145. Furthermore, "[t]he mere fact that

¹ The Final Office Action contains statements reflecting characterizations of the related art and the claims. Regardless of whether any such statement is identified herein, Applicants decline to automatically subscribe to any statement or characterization in the Final Office Action.

references can be combined or modified does not render the resultant combination obvious unless the results would have been predictable to one of ordinary skill in the art” at the time the invention was made. MPEP § 2143.01(III), internal citation omitted. Moreover, “[i]n determining the differences between the prior art and the claims, the question under 35 U.S.C. § 103 is not whether the differences themselves would have been obvious, but whether the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious.” MPEP § 2141.02(I), internal citations omitted (emphasis in original).

“[T]he framework for the objective analysis for determining obviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103 is stated in *Graham v. John Deere Co.*, 383 U.S. 1, 148 USPQ 459 (1966).... The factual inquiries . . . [include determining the scope and content of the prior art and] . . . [a]scertaining the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art.” MPEP § 2141(II). “Office personnel must explain why the difference(s) between the prior art and the claimed invention would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art.” MPEP § 2141(III). In this application, a *prima facie* case of obviousness has not been established because the Final Office Action has neither properly determined the scope and content of the prior art nor properly ascertained the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art. Accordingly, the Final Office Action has failed to clearly articulate a reason why the prior art would have rendered the claimed invention obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art.

Claim 1, as amended, recites a combination including “wherein the number domain comprises a contents classification number, a first domain number, and a second domain number ... the contents classification number, the first domain number and the second domain number are arranged in the number domain according to a

predetermined sequence; the contents classification number is a pre-set shortcut number according to a classification of the contents, the first domain number is a pre-set shortcut number associated with each of the highest level domains; and the first domain number, the second domain number, and the contents classification number can be determined arbitrarily by the user, respectively” (emphases added). The applied references, whether taken alone or in combination, fail to disclose or suggest at least this feature.

Jang discloses “[a] wireless Internet connection method using combination of numbers.” Jang, Abstract. However, Jang does not disclose Applicants’ claimed “contents classification number [which] is a pre-set shortcut number according to a classification of the contents,” as recited in claim 1. For example, the pre-set shortcut number associated with a portal site contents may be “1343,” etc. Jang is silent about at least this claim element.

In addition, Jang does not disclose Applicants’ claimed “first domain number [which] is a pre-set shortcut number associated with each of the highest level domains,” as recited in claim 1. For example, the pre-set shortcut number associated with “com” may be “2,” etc. Jang is also silent about this claim element.

Moreover, In Jang, the numerical combination linked to a wireless Internet site is determined by the site administrator. See Jang, paragraph [0045]. This does not constitute Applicants’ claimed “[wherein] the first domain number, the second domain number, and the contents classification number can be determined arbitrarily by the user, respectively,” as recited in claim 1.

Griswold does not cure the deficiencies of Jang. For example, Griswold discloses a “country code” or “nation code.” See Griswold, paragraph [0133]. However, Griswold’s country code is a fixed number and cannot be changeable by a user. In addition, Griswold does not disclose Applicants’ claimed “contents classification number” and “first domain number” in its entire disclosure.

Accordingly, the elements recited in claim 1 are neither taught nor suggested by the applied references. Nor has the Examiner explained how the teachings of the references could be modified to achieve the claimed combination. Consequently, the Final Office Action has neither properly determined the scope and content of the prior art nor properly ascertained the differences between the prior art and the claimed invention. Accordingly, no reason has been clearly articulated as to why the claim would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art in view of the prior art. Therefore, a *prima facie* case of obviousness has not been established for claim 1.

For at least the reasons above, amended claim 1 should be allowable. Although different in scope, independent claims 9, 13, and 15-17 recite elements similar to the elements recited in amended claim 1, and should be allowable for at least the same reason as claim 1. In addition, dependent claim 11 should also be allowable at least due to its dependence from allowable claim 9, and because it recites addition features not taught or suggested by the cited references. Accordingly, Applicants respectfully request that the Examiner withdraw the rejection of claims 1, 9, 11, 13, and 15-17 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).

II. Rejection of Claims 10 and 14 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)

Applicants respectfully traverse the rejection of claims 10 and 14 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). No *prima facie* case of obviousness has been established.

As established above, Jang and Griswold, whether taken alone or in combination, fail to disclose or suggest Applicants' claimed "wherein the number domain comprises a contents classification number, a first domain number, and a second domain number ... the contents classification number, the first domain number and the second domain number are arranged in the number domain according to a predetermined sequence; the contents classification number is a pre-set shortcut number according to a classification of the contents, the first domain number is a pre-set shortcut number associated with each of the highest level domains; and the first domain number, the second domain number, and the contents classification number can be determined arbitrarily by the user, respectively," as recited in claim 1 (emphases added).

Hunter does not cure the deficiencies of Jang and Griswold. For example, Hunter discloses that "the linkage code includes two subcodes: a routing identification code ("RID") and an item identification code ("IID")." Hunter, col. 5, lines 8-10. Hunter further discloses that the linkage code can be a UPC barcode, a European EAN code, or a ISBN code for a book. See Hunter, col. 5, lines 2-6. However, none of these codes are "determined arbitrarily by [a] user," as recited by amended claim 1. Although Hunter discloses that the linkage code can also be of "custom linkage code formats" (emphasis added, Hunter, col. 5, lines 6-7), it is clear that in Hunter, the "customization" of the linkage code is with respect to the standard or non-standard format of the code,

not to the content of the code determined by the user. Indeed, Hunter discloses a registration procedure wherein “[a] registration server returns a user identification code [which is a part of the linkage code] to the client, which caches it.” Hunter, col. 5, lines 35-37 (emphasis added). That is, at least a part of the linkage code in Hunter is generated by a registration server and the user merely receives the code from the server. Although the code can be of a non-standard, customized format (none of the disclosed UPC, EAN, or ISBN formats), the content of the code is not determined by the user himself because he only receives what has already been generated by the registration server. In addition, Hunter is silent about Applicants’ claimed “contents classification number” and “first domain number,” as recited in claim 1.

Accordingly, the elements recited in claim 1 are neither taught nor suggested by the applied references. Nor has the Examiner explained how the teachings of the references could be modified to achieve the claimed combination. Consequently, the Final Office Action has neither properly determined the scope and content of the prior art nor properly ascertained the differences between the prior art and the claimed invention. Accordingly, no reason has been clearly articulated as to why the claim would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art in view of the prior art. Therefore, a *prima facie* case of obviousness has not been established for claim 1.

For at least the reasons above, amended claim 1 should be allowable over Jang, Griswold, and Hunter.

If an independent claim is nonobvious under 35 U.S.C. 103, then any claim depending therefrom is nonobvious. *In re Fine*, 837 F.2d 1071, 5 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1596

(Fed. Cir. 1988). Accordingly, Applicants respectfully request that the Examiner withdraw the rejection of dependent claims 10 and 14 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).

III. Conclusion

Applicants respectfully request that this Amendment after Final under 37 C.F.R. § 1.116 be entered by the Examiner, placing all of pending claims 1, 9-11, and 13-17 in condition for allowance. Further, entry of this Amendment after Final would place the application in better form for appeal, should the Examiner continue to dispute the patentability of the pending claims.

Please grant any extensions of time required to enter this response and charge any additional required fees to our deposit account 06-0916.

Respectfully submitted,

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